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abstract
This essay examines three court documents revealing how late medieval and 
early modern English women employed rhetorical strategies or exploited the 
conventions of the legal system so as to negotiate another’s safety, insist on a different 
knowledge of their economic and sexual position, and openly negotiate the terms 
of their subordination. It is to this different knowledge of both her economic and 
sexual position, and the negotiation of such terms that Agnes Barons’ testimony 
in July 1636 bears witness. Joan Smith even more aggressively than Barons insists 
upon a different knowledge of both her and Elizabeth Moorfoote’s socio-economic 
position and challenges the authority of a self-deputized constable in the second 
deposition under discussion, namely, the Elizabeth Moorfoote vs. William Crowther 
case of 1596. In the last deposition, Susan More challenges the socially inherited 
ideological constructs of single women as threats to economic stability and sexual 
order, family relationships and community, in the 1608 John Scales vs Thomas 
Creede case. Thomas Creede was Shakespeare’s printer1. 
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When historians broke open the study of depositions, and uncovered valuable 
testimonial evidence of women’s active roles in the legal system, every discipline 
benefited. By repositioning those testimonies in a broader cultural role —here, late 
medieval and early modern England— we, in literature, language, law, sociology, 
etc., could now open them up to an analysis of women’s interpretative maneuvers 
and rhetorical courage within legal (masculine) discourse. We could now, also, 
witness women devising forms of talk/conversation so as to insist on a different 
knowledge of their economic and sexual position, and to openly negotiate the terms 
of their subordination. 1
Because this essay deals so extensively with documents and interpretation 
which, in turn, involve one in attempts to constitute knowledge about the past, 
I must address a fundamental issue at this point —namely, the role of language 
in the creation of knowledge and “reality”. As linguists and semioticians have 
argued since the mid-twentieth century, we construct knowledge (i.e., our mental 
and discursive representation of “reality”) solely through language. However, 
language is itself a human construct. It is made-up set of units of sound: phonemes, 
morphemes, etc. There is no natural relationship between language and the world 
that we describe through language2. There is nothing inherently “tree-ish” about 
the word “tree”, as the favorite example puts it. The point is that if we cannot even 
think about reality without thinking through language, if all thought is linguistic 
through and through3. Then the consequences for this essay are twofold: first, 
there is my part as the reader/interpreter. All representations that I make of the 
documents’ implications are ultimately coded with my own meanings or desires, 
given that knowledge is a repository of accumulative meanings and experience. 
Second, there is the document itself. It, too, is coded: there is a deep structure 
to any text/document or deposition that is part of a larger (sign) system within 
which is encoded the experience, understandings, and power relationships of the 
witnesses testifying as well as of the notaries recording those testimonies. Encoded, 
too, are the epistemological assumptions of the language of the text, itself: i.e., the 
way the language of the period itself classified phenomena or “divide[d] up and 
interpret[ed] that world”4. Moreover, whatever liveliness, mental state or rhetorical 
maneuvering that I ascribe to the women subjects of this essay, those behaviors 
must be seen, in Carlo Ginsburg’s words, as “both real and illusory”5. “Access to the 
past is always mediated, and, thus, always partial”, Ginsburg cautioned. And “since 
it is always mediated, always tied to a point of view, historical knowledge is by 
1. Used abbreviations: DRO, Devon Records Office; LMA, London Metropolitan Archives.
2. de Saussure, Ferdinand. Course in General Linguistics (1916); new translation by Roy Harris: de Saussure, 
Ferdinand. Course in General Linguistics. London: Duckworth, 1983: 67, 69-69 and 117. 
3. Or, in David Tracy’s words, “all understanding is linguistic through and through” (Tracy, David. 
Plurality and Ambiguity: Hermeneutics, Religion, Hope. San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1987: 43).
4. Grace, George W. The Linguistic Construction of Reality. New York: Croom Helm, 1987: 7.
5. Ginsburg, Carlo. The Cheese and the Worms: The Cosmos of a Sixteenth-Century Miller. Baltimore: The Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 2013. Preface to the 2013 Edition, non-paginated. 
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definition perfectible, even when, as can happen, human error does not intrude”6. 
Alun Munslow cites Roger Chartier’s more direct view “[N]o text, even ‘the most 
apparently documentary, even the most ‘objective’, can ever ‘maintain a transparent 
relationship with the reality that it apprehends’”7. 
As a writer looking at these depositions, I am therefore faced with two obligations: 
the first is to avoid privileging a single voice or a single interpretation; the second 
is to offer readers access to a complex of attitudes and codes of behavior, to surface 
alternative “truths”, other voices, and other, multiple, ways of knowing that are 
embedded in these non-transparent texts. This study attempts to take advantage of 
the multiple layers in language that inhere in depositions which are themselves a 
“re-representation” of “narrative” as well as of an historical event. As I will argue, 
within those re-representations appear to be specific narrative strategies, specific 
legal maneuverings, devised by women witnesses so as to insist upon a diffferent 
knowledge of their economic and sexual position, and to openly negotiate the terms 
of their subordination. 
It is to this different knowledge of both her economic and sexual position, 
and the negotiation of such terms that, I argue, Agnes Barons’ testimony in July 
1636 bears witness. Joan Smith even more aggressively than Barons appears to 
insist upon a different knowledge of both her and Elizabeth Moorfoote’s socio-
economic position in the second deposition under discussion, namely, the Elizabeth 
Moorfoote vs William Crowther case of 1596. In the last deposition, Suzan More 
openly challenges the socially inherited ideological constructs of single women as 
threats to economic stability and sexual order, family relationships and community, 
in the 1608 John Scales vs. Thomas Creede case. 
Agnes Barons (of Devon, England), about 24 years old, was one of two 
maidservants in the kitchen when Audrey Rowell spotted Humphrey Harris at the 
kitchen window loading gravel. Rowell observed aloud that Annie Geffrey had cost 
William Harris (Humphrey’s father), forty pounds. The hint at sexual misconduct 
was unmistakable, particularly since Rowell then added that “there was not such 
an old whoremaster more in the country and... such a bawdye old knave in the 
country all which words she the said Audry did speake in raylinge and scoffinge 
manner of the said William Harris”8. The plaintiff, William Harris, sued Rowell, and 
called upon both Agnes Barons and Elizabeth Mills (the other maidservant) to give 
testimony. But Barons’ own sexual character and financial honesty now came under 
attack. As part of Rowell’s counsel’s defense strategy, they charged that Barons had 
been brought before a justice of peace by Mr. Done, her previous master, who had 
6. Ginsburg, Carlo. The Cheese and the Worms...
7. Chartier, Roger. Cultural History: Between Practices and Representations. Cambridge (UK): Cambridge 
University Press, 1988: 43. Cited in: Munslow, Alun. Deconstructing History. New York: Routledge, 1997: 
27.
8. DRO. Ms. Chanter 866, William Harris contra Audrey Rowell, f. 220v-222v, especially, f. 220v. A 
briefer discussion of the implications of Agnes Barons testimony appears in Chapter 3: “Women, Crime, 
Conversation and the Courts”, Language as the Site of Revolt in Medieval and Early Modern England: Speaking 
as a Woman, Mary C. Bodden, ed. New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2011: 93-96.
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accused her of leaving his employ without permission and of stealing food worth 
18 pence (considered grand larceny). Rowell’s counsel also alleged that Barons had 
borne an illegitimate child four years before. Simple and direct as Barons’ response 
appears to be, it was, in fact, a careful threading through the troubled terrain of 
national debates about the economic and religious identity of women. The issues 
concerned “masterless women” versus women as subject to a master’s authority, 
perceived as parallel to that of husbands, fathers, and the church. Linked to the 
economic independence of women were fears about women’s sexual freedom (a 
view clearly subscribed to by Rowell’s defense counsel). Barons’ cultural experience, 
however, could reasonably suppose the “right to mobility”, an economic value that 
gave servants “their most powerful weapon in negotiations for better wages and 
working conditions, whether from the current master or a different employer”9. 
Nevertheless, women’s labor was “perceived as less ‘free’ than that of their male 
counterparts”10, and, in fact, local officials could “order unmarried women between 
the ages of twelve and forty years into service, for whatever wages the officials 
thought fit”11. In Barons’ own lifetime, women without employment, “found 
masterless”, were typically “ordered to the House of Correction for a whipping”12. 
Seventeenth-century court records contemporaneous with Barons’ quitting of 
Mr. Done’s service “are littered with orders to masterless individuals, frequently 
women, to put themselves into service”13. Consequently, despite Barons’ having 
given her master the usual three months’ notice of her intention to quit his service, 
presumably intending then to work for a Mr. Pomery in the same parish, he could 
expect the law to support his refusal to part with her. 
Barons’ answer is not simply personal, it is political: 
And [Mr Done] did procure a process from Mr Cabell [justice of peace] to call [me] 
before him. And [I] went to the said justice, and there Mr Done did chardge [me] 
that [I] had made covenant to serve him, and that he would not release [me] of 
his service[.] And [I] then did refuse to goe to his service, and denied any such 
promise, as [I] justly might, and then Mr Cabell told the said Mr Done that he [Mr 
Done] had nothing to do with [my] service, except he could chardge [me] with 
any wrong [I] had done in [my] service, or had stolen any thinge. Where to Mr 
Done answered that he would not chardge [me] with any thinge[.] Yet afterwards 
9. Mendelson, Sara H. “‘To shift for a cloak’: Disorderly Women in the Church Courts”, Women and History: 
Voices in Early Modern England, Valerie Frith, ed. Toronto: Coach House Press, 1995: 3-18, especially, 8.
10. Mendelson, Sara H. “‘To shift for a cloak’...”: 9.
11. Mendelson, Sara H. “‘To shift for a cloak’...”: 3. The Statute of Artificers of 1563 was intended 
to “determine wage rates at the local level, to control conditions of employment for many workers 
including apprentices, and to restrict the mobility of labour” (Woodward, Donald. “The Background to 
the Statute of Artificers: The Genesis of Labour Policy, 1558-1563”. The Economic History Review, 33/1 
(1980): 32-44, especially, 32). 
12. Crawford, Patricia. Women and Religion in England 1500-1720. New York: Routledge, 1993: 48. In 
Chapter 2, note 51, Crawford points out that there were “numerous cases in the Mayor’s court book in 
Norwich”.
13. Underdown, David. Revel, Riot and Rebellion: Popular Politics and Culture in England, 1603-1660. Oxford 
(UK): Clarendon Press, 1985: 37 and note 104.
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in [the] presence of Mr Cabell, the said Mr Done did say to [me] that he could 
chardge [me] for a piece of beif which [I] gave away at his dore. And then Mr 
Cabell examininge the matter farther, the said Mr Done said that [I] gave awa[y] 
a peece of beif at his dore to a poore woeman worth 18 pence. And [I] did then 
presently prove before the justice by him that bought the beif that the peece of 
beif did cost but 14 pence, and that it was boyled in [my] master’s house, and 
that ten people had the same at dinner. And [I] gave a little of that which was 
left to a poore woeman at the door, and some of it [I] kept in the house till next 
day. And when Mr Cabell saw how he was abused by hearinge such a brable, he 
was very angry with Mr Done and did bynd over him and [me] to answer at the 
[Quarter] Sessions[.] And [I] was at the last Sessions at the Castle of Exeter but 
was not called nor questioned there, only [I] was willed to pay Mr Cabell’s clerk 
the fees. And [I am] a single woeman and unmarried, and about fourteen years 
since, [I] was betrothed and had bannes published in the church[.] And the man 
left [me] and refused to marry [me], after he had abused [me] and brought [me] 
with child14.
She was only a servant, yet an emphasis on female agency surfaces everywhere in 
Agnes (or Anne) Barons’ deposition. She actively insisted on a different knowledge 
of her economic and sexual position —all the while dialoguing with the community 
by referencing community mores and its culture, even as she intended to liberate 
herself from the cultural expectation of obedience to the master. Barons’ unapologetic 
“[I] did refuse to go to his service”, and her description of having “justly” denied his 
claim of a covenant between them, emphasized her agency and silently reminded 
the community that she had availed herself of the socio-legal custom of giving notice 
on Lady Day, March 25, the first of the quarter days when servants could be hired 
or terminated, and rents were due. What is more, she aligned herself as pro-active 
in positive female community activities, dispensing charity. In fact, in her deposition 
female agency, consistently compared to male agency, emerges as knowledgeable 
and honorable: unlike Mr. Done, she had not lied about a covenant, she had not 
falsely accused anyone of theft, and she had not falsely misstated the monetary 
value of the beef. And unlike the (male) counsel’s deliberate intention to cast doubt 
on her sexual chastity, she re-asserted her right to an honorable sexual reputation 
while simultaneously revealing the desertion by the man betrothed to her after 
the banns for their marriage had been published. Published banns were key to the 
community’s view of her position. Many couples regarded the official betrothal “as a 
warrant to initiate sexual relations, taking pregnancy as an urgent cue for marriage. 
Such mores were based on mutual trust and the vigilance of informal community 
sanctions”15. Martin Ingram’s position is more qualified: “Attitudes to antenuptial 
fornication are best summed up as ambivalent” and the “narrow dividing line 
between bridal pregnancy and bastardy” “made it impossible for local communities 
to regard sex before marriage in church as wholly licit”16. The fact is, however, 
14. DRO. Ms. Chanter 866, f. 221r-221v. 
15. Mendelson, Sara H. “‘To shift for a cloak’...”: 9.
16. Ingram, Martin. Church Courts, Sex and Marriage in England, 1570-1640. Cambridge (UK): Cambridge 
University Press, 1987: 230. Ingram’s studies lead him to ask “just how firmly engaged were such 
couples” who were court defendants accused of sexual relations before marriage. He notes that while “as 
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that Barons’ defense —however mediated by the court clerk— had reconstructed 
the hegemonic ideology (respect for economic property, charitable obligations, 
marriage accountability) and had shown the dominators (men) to be the violators 
of the ideological standards propagated by themselves. The judge’s anger over the 
“brabble” was aimed at Mr. Done, not at Barons (even though both were to appear 
at another Sessions, where Barons noted that she was left unsummoned, implying 
her silent acquittal).
Women’s legal powers, their domestic status, their financial vulnerability, their 
community standing, their legal identity itself were understood (by women and 
men) in terms of the men’s authority, male constraints, male hierarchal powers; 
in other words, the male sphere. The male sphere shaped women’s discourse, 
determined their rhetorical strategies, and their framing methods. In such a world of 
inequities where solely language (not speech... because speech was itself frequently 
criminalized) was as available to women as to men, it makes sense, in my view, that 
language, along with, eventually, speech and discourse became the arena in which 
women frequently outmaneuvered the interpretative practices of men. The very 
instability of language disallows any closed process of meanings. Devising narrative 
strategies that can disrupt and subvert culturally inherited truths dependent upon 
that instability could save lives, keep women out of the stocks, and out of jail. 
Perhaps the greatest need for such narrative strategy would be among women 
whose public image already severely disadvantaged them, namely, alewives or 
alehouse keepers. Two alehouse keepers, Joan Smith and Elizabeth Moorfoote, not 
only challenge the stereotype of drunkenness and moral disrepute but they may 
also be evidence that alewives had more authority, social power, and community 
standing than history and literature have granted them. 
Sometime in March of 1589, Elizabeth Moorfoote had persuaded Joan Smith 
to go with her and two other women to Kingsland in Hackney (outside London), 
where she lived, to give testimony about a past financial transaction17. They stopped 
to drink at Moorfoote’s alehouse on Kingsland Street in Kingsland and drank a 
pott or two of beer. Smith then left to visit Simmons, an old acquaintance, nearby. 
As she was leaving Simmons, Smith spied Sybil Dodd quarreling in the street with 
one of the women who had accompanied her and Moorfoote. At the same time, 
a certain Mr. William Crowther, on the way to his own house, hearing the noisy 
brawl came along and grabbed Elizabeth Moorfoote who was not involved in the 
fracas and shouted at her, “this is your doing, Elizabeth Moorfoote”, and he added, 
“I will have yow carted owte of the towne”. Moorfoote countered, as one witness 
said, “in faithe Mr. Crowther keepe yow yor self aswell from hanginge as I will 
many as 70 per cent of cases in the court of the archdeacon of Salisbury in the year 1627-1629” alleged 
prior intention to marry, such allegations were rarely made by defendants in Wiltshire (229). Informal 
promises seem to co-exist with the (declining) practice of “formal spousals” (229).
17. “what money one George Goodman(n) did spende in [Joan Smith’s Alehowse] in the companeye 
of Elizabeth Moorfoote” (LMA. DL/C 213 (c.1590), 658-664, and 662). In the body of this essay all 
subsequent quotations from this manuscript will be immediately followed by the page numbers on 
which that quote appears. 
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keepe me from carting and then yow shall not neede feare the gallowes”. Crowther, 
“in a greate rage and choller”, replied, “godes blood[,] you arrant whore and with 
that he gave her a box upon the eare that she fell withall”18.
Crowther then hauled Moorfoote off to the stocks and set her in, threatening to do 
the same with Mrs. Smith. Moorfoote did not go quietly. She scratched Crowther’s 
face, tore his ruff from his neck, and the ruff from his wife’s neck as well —his wife 
having joined her husband, presumably to assist him. 
When this matter was first brought before Justice Machell, Machell sentenced 
Moorfoote to be dunked for a scold. However, one of the witnesses, a Mr. Fabian 
Crookehorn (who had leased a house owned by Crowther) along with Mr. Harman 
(the town constable) went to Justice Machell, and offered a fuller account of the 
altercation. Machell than reversed his judgment, dismissed Moorfoote, and bluntly 
chastised Crowther with “some hard speeches”. 
A year later, in 1590, Elizabeth Moorfoote now brought a suite against Crowther 
for defamation of character arising out of Crowther’s conduct, and arising also out 
of her public humiliation of being set in the stocks and initially sentenced to be 
dunked as a scold. This case, as I see it, is not so much about the breaking of the law 
or personal assault, as it is, rather, about social power and public reputation. Bringing 
Crowther to court was an extraordinary move by Moorfoote, given the exceptional 
powers that constables had in this period19. Even Fabian Crookehorn, a gentleman, 
took care to avoid retaliation by Crowther by telling Crowther that he was testifying 
against his will, and by ensuring that Elizabeth Moorfoote explicitly served process 
on him to serve as a witness rather than risk being thought as volunteering testimony 
against Crowther20. It is Joan Smith’s deposition (Smith having been called back 
to Kingsland to be deposed as a witness) that offers such a powerful example of 
how women seem to have understood the specialized discourse of the law and the 
networks of power codified in judgments. Her opening lines already negotiate her 
reputation and align her interests with the peace-keeping role of the judge: Smith 
first cast herself as a mediator, saying that while she was: 
at Simmons house as aforesaid Dodds wife and wedow wyatt if so she be called 
revyved an old quarell that was betweene them and this examinante when she 
18. LMA. DL/C 213 (c.1590), 660.
19. Briggs, John; Harrison, Christopher; McInnes, Angus; Vincent, David. Crime and Punishment in 
England: An Introductory History. London: University College London Press, 1996: 53-54, point to the 
power of the English constable, asserting that by the “close of the sixteenth century hardly any aspect of 
law enforcement at the local level lay outside his brief” (53).
20. LMA. DL/C 213, 662. Fabian Crookehorn “did tell Wm. Crowther that he came to testifye againste 
his will and that he was served process which he did of purpose to understand wether Wm. Crowther 
wold take it well or ill that he came testifye and perceaving Crowther to take it ill he this respondent 
refused to appeare that corte day and enformed the Moorfootes wife to serve him with process before 
he wolde come to testifye which process was served upon him before the nexte corte daye then nexte 
following”.
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sawe them fighting togethers devyded them as well as she cold and pulled the one 
from thother21.
Smith’s tactic wasn’t some simple epistemic assumption that her peacemaking 
activity would privilege her testimony. Her strategy, rather, effectively casts Sybil 
Dodd and Widow Wyatt as women unable to let an old quarrel die, and (even 
more socially reprehensible) as women willing to take their quarrel to a public and 
physical level. There is a particular rhetorical device at work in Smith’s construction 
of the event, namely, the technique of an implied comparison: compared to Sybil 
Dodd and Widow Wyatt, Moorfoote appears as a model of social and communal 
stability, and Smith herself appears expressly to be an agent of responsibility and 
communal concern.
Smith then volunteered apparently non-essential information: she expanded on 
the escalating violence between Widow Wyatt and Dodd’s wife: 
and yet Dods wife was so furious that notwithstanding that the said wyatt wedow 
was takinge her waye to London warde she followed her with a fagott stick in her 
hand intente to strike her and the wedow perceaving her intent turned her selfe 
abowte and tooke the sticke owte of Dods wifes hand and strucke her upon the 
hed with the same and broke her hed and then came Crowther busyle to make an 
ende of that quarrel and began another22.
It may have been non-essential information, but it was rhetorically effective: 
the violence of Sybil Dodd and Widow Wyatt alone was referenced; Smith did not 
associate Moorfoote with the fracas. The greater rhetorical maneuvering, however, 
was her explicit linking of Dodd’s and Wyatt’s instigating of disorder to Crowther’s 
instigating disorder, himself: Crowther was described as coming along “busyle”. 
Some lines earlier (p. 663) she had already testified to Crowther’s “busyle” nature, 
and at that point she had already linked his busy-body nature to the instigation of 
the clash between him and Elizabeth Moorfoote. She added that Crowther, after 
calling Moorfoote “thow arrant queane Moorfootes wife, this is long of thee”, then
called the said Moorfootes wife arrante whore and saied he wold have her carted 
owte of the towne and therwith he gave her a blowe upon the cheeke that she 
fell and laye sprawling upon the grounde And when she arose againe she saied 
unto him well Mr. Crowther hast thou stricken me: And upon some speeche of 
Mr. Crowther uttered to her againe she the saide Moorfootes wife bad him keep 
himself aswell from hanginge as she wold keep her selfe from carting and he 
shold not neede to feare the gallowes with manie other such lyke wordes that 
passed betweene them but she saieth thereat the firste begyninge of the brawles 
betweene Crowther and Moorfootes wife he the said Crowther did begyn with the 
said Moorfootes wife she gyving him no occasion of offence nor beinge anie cause 
21. LMA. DL/C 213 (c.1590), 664.
22. LMA. DL/C 213 (c.1590), 664.
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of the brawle betweene Dods wife and the other woman [insert: as everie bodie 
reported that was there]23. 
What is clear, according to Smith, was that Moorfoote’s bristly defense was solely 
in response to Crowther’s assault of Moorfoote. 
Framing Smith’s representation of the event, above, were certain critical social 
and political circumstances bound to affect the social and political consciousness of 
both jury and judge24. Every woman’s (and man’s) testimony in aid of an accused 
woman was (and is) by definition an exposition of the social practices and structures 
that oppress women because every deposition reflected its narrator’s understanding 
of (at least) three social systems: communal relationships, networks of power, and 
social rules. In the context, and in this period, the networks of power and social rules 
favored men. Necessarily, then, women’s (and men’s) testimony in favor of other 
women over a male accuser inherently involved subverting (even if unconsciously) 
the ideological assumptions supporting those networks.
One particular aspect of that power was the fact that the dominant (male) power 
interests controlled the depiction of legal reality, legal stability, and legal priorities25. 
Nevertheless, these two women’s testimonies, especially Smith’s, found ways of 
destabilizing the legal repertoire and its mechanics of constructing meanings that 
interpret and sanction hierarchical relations. For example, Smith had introduced 
non-essential but rhetorically effective information when she detailed the escalating 
fight between Dodd’s wife and Widow Wyatt. This not only emphasized Moorfoote’s 
innocent bystander position before Crowther grabbed her, but it also raised questions 
about Crowther’s judgment: why single out Moorfoote when two other women 
were conspicuously breaking the peace? Smith also verbally constructed different 
subject positions that hinted at improvident attitudes toward communal relations 
and social rules. The one having perhaps the greatest impact on the jury and the 
judge was not only Crowther’s “busyle” coming along, but, more dramatically, 
Crowther’s inability to put a woman into the stocks after wrestling for an hour with 
her): 
23. LMA. DL/C 213 (c.1590), 663.
24. Any representation of an event is a linguistic and discursive practice, and given the postructuralist 
view, in Joe Kincheloe’s words, “that there is no such thing as neutral format of representation”. Susan 
Amussen adds, linguistic and discursive practices “are certainly one dimension of oppression” (Kincheloe, 
Joe. “Fiction Formulas: Critical Constructivism and the Representation of Reality”, Representation and the 
Text: Re-Framing the Narrative Voice, William G. Tierney, Yvonna S. Lincoln, eds. New York: State University 
of New York Press, 1997: 57-79, especially, 63; Amussen, Susan D. “Elizabeth I and Alice Balstone, 
Gender, Class, and the Exceptional Woman in Early Modern England”, Attending to Women in Early Modern 
England, Betty S. Travitsky, Adele F. Seeff, eds. Newark: Associated University Press, 1994: 219-240, 
especially, 230). This, of course, raises questions about my own positionality as an “authoritative truth 
teller” interpretating Smith’s narrative voice (Kincheloe, Joe. “Fiction Formulas...”: 63). 
25. Herrup, Cynthia B. “Law and Morality in Seventeenth-Century England”. Past and Present, 106 
(1985): 102-123, especially, 104. 
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said Crowther did putt Moorfootes wife into the stocks and was struggling with 
this respondent the space one of one hower almost of intente to have putt this 
respondent into the stocks bycause she called him knave for striking of a woman 
meaning Moorfootes wife but this respondent gyvinge no other cause of offence 
but onely that wold not permit him to stocke her and especiallye for avoyding 
further revenged upon Crowther if he had done it but bycause she gott the 
vyctorye in that matter she wold never lett her husbande knowe it for feare least 
Crowthers cote should have byn well lined for his foolishe attempte26.
Here, Smith constructed a powerless male authority in Crowther: he cannot 
manage the duties of a constable. 
Both Barons and Smith critiqued male power and male weakness: each 
incorporated insights into the cultural expectations of men and thus delegitimized 
their social status when, for example, Barons related the judge’s disgust with Mr. 
Done and when Smith described Crowther “struggling” for the “space of one hower 
almost” to put her, unsuccessfully, into the stocks. Both Barons and Smith also 
employed irony as a comment on ideological expectations of men’s superior moral 
condition and men’s superior strength: Barons represented hereself as honorable 
and truthful: unlike Mr. Done, she had not falsely accused anyone of theft, and 
she had not falsely misstated the monetary value of the beef mostly consumed by 
Done’s household, and she acquitted her pregnancy as legitimate. 
Smith’s narrative techniques seemed to anticipate and (to intend to?) confound 
the likely dominant interests of the court —namely, their inclination to support 
masculine authority represented in Crowther’s actions— even when a clear rightful 
verdict should have favored Moorfoote or any assaulted innocent woman. As one 
of my graduate students expressed it in our seminar examining various depositions: 
“Policing women was the responsibility of men; Crowther was a man punishing a 
woman for (supposedly) originating and then exacerbating a breach of the peace. 
Legally punishing Crowther for his exercise of power might have been seen by the 
jury as a blow against male authority”27. 
All the more impressive, then, was Mrs. Smith’s framing of legal discourse so as to 
negotiate Moorfoote’s safety, and publicly critique cultural “truths” or inherited legal 
discourse. In Smith’s three or four sentences, above, concerning Crowther’s putting 
Moorfoote in the stocks and struggling with Smith herself, there are embedded at 
least three or four discursive practices that tap into problems central to the culture 
of the period. In the first place, William Crowther was not the town’s constable; he 
appears, according to others’ testimony, to have deputized himself; there is a hint 
in one of the testimonies that the town’s official constable, Constable Harman, was 
sick. It is therefore striking that a self-appointed authority not only took extreme 
measures with an innocent woman, Moorfoote, but also attempted to do the same 
with her companion, Smith. He seems not even to have served a warning to the 
brawling Widow Wyatt and Sybil Dodd. And even more striking is the fact that he 
26. LMA. DL/C 213 (c.1590), 664.
27. Parkison, Sean. Graduate Seminar: “Gender and Crime”, Marquette University, Spring 2010.
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was successful in having the Justice of Peace sentence Moorfoote to be dunked as 
a scold —a brutal form of torture reserved for scolds and witches— and successful, 
too, in bringing Smith before the judge.
Second, would Crowther have taken such measures against women with not 
so public a profile as alehouse keepers had? His initiative, it is to be remembered, 
was at first supported by the judge. Given the national, religious, and legal, view 
of alehouses as sites of violence and disorder, the judge’s support is not surprising. 
Then, too, it was outside Moorfoote’s alehouse, after all, that the public brawling 
took place. In this period, alehouses’ association with vice and crime seem 
environmentally of a piece, being usually squalid, poorly furnished and small. And 
they were more suspect than inns or taverns because they were more likely to host 
vagrants who could present a threat to the community, according to Peter Clark28. 
Third, these symbols of “social decadence and disruption”29, as Kevin Sharpe 
described alehouses, had long been the subject of government and municipal 
policies. In the late tenth century, King Edgar abolished all alehouses except one 
in each borough or small town; in 1285, Edward I signed a statute that imposed a 
curfew on alehouses and taverns, a statute that was copied in the Liber Albus in the 
early fifteenth century30. Edward VI (statute 5 and 6, chap. 25) determined that 
“none should keep an alehouse without a licence by two justices of the peace”31. 
Ten years after the Moorfoote vs. Crowther case, there was, in 1599, a royal 
proclamation “suppressing the unnecessary number of ale-houses”32. Edward VI’s 
statute (5 and 6, chap 25) had given “power to the justices to suppress unnecessary 
tippling-houses, but it was chiefly directed against disorder, not against excessive 
drinking”33. With Elizabeth I, the control and restrictions against alehouses lay in 
their being perceived as sites of theft, disorderly behavior, and the squandering of 
money. Garthine Walker writes that “between 1576 and 1610 there were thirty-
five parliamentary bills concerning drunkenness, inns, and alehouses”34. Crowther 
could well assume that the community might more readily sanction his actions than 
question them. 
Fourth, contemporary literature seems to reflect the special targeting of female 
alehouse keepers. For one thing, alehouse proprietors were more frequently women 
than men, according to Rodney Hilton35. Seen as sexually aggressive, serving 
28. Clark, Peter. The English Alehouse: A Social History 1200-1830. London: Longman, 1983: 12-13.
29. Sharpe, Kevin. The Personal Rule of Charles I. Avon: The Bath Press, 1992: 482.
30. Hanawalt, Barbara A. “Of Good and Ill Repute”: Gender and Social Control in Medieval England. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1998: 111, 114. 
31. Comyns, Sir John; Kyd, Stewart. A Digest of the Laws of England: Volume 4. Dublin: Luke White, 1793: 558.
32. Iles, C. M. “Early Stages of English Public House Regulation”. The Economic Journal: The Quarterly 
Journal of the Royal Economic Society, 13 (1903): 251-262, especially, 257.
33. Cunningham, William. The Growth of English Industry and Commerce in Modern Times. Cambridge (UK): 
Cambridge University Press, 1892: 160, n. 6. 
34. Walker, Garthine. Crime, Gender and Social Order in Early Modern England. Cambridge (UK): Cambridge 
University Press, 2003: 226. 
35. Hilton, Rodney. Class Conflict and the Crisis of Feudalism: Essays in Medieval Social History. London: 
Hambledon Press, 1985: 215.
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diluted (sometimes contaminated) ale, overpricing their ale, and inciting disorderly 
behavior, they are featured in ballads, tracts, church sculpture, plays and poetic 
narratives36. Then, too, female gatherings, women’s alliances, women grouping 
together in alehouses threatened patriarchal control and community stability, as 
the anonymous poem, “Gossip mine”, as well as “Jyl of Brentford’s Testimony”, and 
“The Kind Beleeving Hostess” dramatize. Crowther’s aggressive attitude towards 
Moorfoote as an alehouse keeper was, it seems, a natural part of a fundamental and 
cultural distrust of the ale trade and alewives. 
But that is, in fact, what makes the Moorfoote case so intriguing. Both Moorfoote 
and Smith were, as stated, alehouse keepers. Moorfoote, however, was, by her 
neighbors’ accounts, a thoroughly upright citizen. In her deposition, Smith presents 
herself as a socially and financially respectable citizen (she had accompanied 
Moorfoote to Kingsland in the first place in order to serve as a witness regarding 
a financial transaction at Smith’s alehouse). Despite their alewife status, both 
Moorfoote and Smith appear to have considerable social power. Not only Fabian 
Crookhorn, a witness of gentleman status, but also the town’s Constable, Constable 
Harman, went to Judge Machell to argue on Moorfoote’s behalf. Both were local 
men of considerable standing, suggesting that Moorfoote’s own social position 
was worth their intercession. Judith Bennett remarks upon the “ambivalence and 
hostility as well as approval” that greeted “the authority that women derived from 
brewing”37. People “felt anxious about the seemingly excessive power of brewsters,” 
she says38. Commercial brewing appears to have been exceptionally profitable work 
for a woman, as well as opening up “some exceptional public roles to women, 
especially in terms of legal capability”39. Women generally could not serve as 
compurgators40, but, as Bennett records, “in some borough courts, this rule was 
36. As Judith M. Bennett notes, alewives themselves were often colored as a disreputable lot. Among 
the best known representations of alewives at the time mentioned by Bennett are Elynour Rummyng, 
a grotesque, aged, profane, and sexually aggressive alewife from a Skelton poem; at the end of the 
Chester Mystery Cycle, we find an alewife, a damned soul, who served watered-down hooch before 
finding her way to hell; and Mother Bunch, purportedly based on a real alewife, is the female narrator 
of the 1604 book Pasquil’s Jests (Bennett, Judith M. Ale, Beer, and Brewsters in England: Women’s Work in a 
Changing World, 1300-1600. Oxford (UK): Oxford University Press, 1996: 122-130). Bunch was another 
jovial and physically gross alewife of folk literature in the manner of Rummyng or the similar Long 
Meg of Westminster, only more so. For instance, in the book Bunch is described as possessing such 
prodigious flatulence that “Shee was once wrung with wind in her belly, and with one blast of her 
taile, she blew down Charing-Crosse, with pauls aspiring steeple [...]” (Bennett, Judith M. Ale, Beer, 
and Brewsters, cites Pasquil’s Jests with the merriments of Mother Bunch [London, 1629]: 8). See also: Jyl of 
Brentford’s Testament, and The Canterbury Tales. See also the early fifteenth-century carving of the devil 
carrying off the alewoman to hell. 7 January 2012. <http://www.paradoxplace.com/Photo%20Pages/
UK/Britain_Centre/Ludlow/Ludlow_misericords.htm>.
37. Bennett, Judith M. Ale, Beer, and Brewsters...: 35.
38. Bennett, Judith M. Ale, Beer, and Brewsters...: 35.
39. Bennett, Judith M. Ale, Beer, and Brewsters...: 35-36.
40. A compurgator is one who bears witness to the truth or the innocence of another.
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mitigated for brewsters, who were allowed to bring other women to swear on their 
behalf”41.
It is telling, therefore, that Moorfoote had two such local men to stand up for her, 
men of social and legal standing, to convince the judges. If Constable Harman, the 
official constable42, gave witness for Moorfoote, we might assume that Moorfoote’s 
alehouse had not generally posed a problem for the constable in keeping the peace. 
On the other hand, as Judith Bennett points out, “More than many other women, 
alewives threatened the proper patriarchal order: in flirting with customers, they 
undermined the authority of their husbands; in handling money, goods, and debts, 
they challenged the economic power of men; in bargaining with male customers, 
they achieved a seemingly unnatural power over men; in avoiding effective 
regulation of their trade, they insulted the power of male officers and magistrates; 
and perhaps most importantly, in simply pursuing their trade, they often worked 
independently of men”43. In her 2009 Dissertation, Katherine Karlin notes “evidence 
of countervailing attitudes towards working women”, including alewives. She 
admits that these are minority voices, but the point relevant to this essay is that 
those countervailing attitudes toward alewives’ “presence in the popular theater 
attests to the range and heterogeneity of opinion” 44. All of this suggests that, while 
Moorfoote’s status as an alewife may have been problematic, the position itself held 
a certain civic power. 
The view of women and the law is still emphatically cautionary, even as late as 
1996. As Radha Jhappan notes regarding Carol Smart and her 1996 discussion of 
“Feminism and the Law”, “women should be extremely cautious of resorting to 
law because it disqualifies women’s knowledge and experience”45. Yet Moorfoote 
did precisely that —in the face of three facts that would ordinarily have rendered a 
jury’s or judge’s decision in William Crowther’s favor: first, controlling women was 
the civic and moral responsibility of men; second, Crowther, whether deputized or 
not, was exercising a male privilege to punish a woman for (presumably) initiating 
—the quarrelling took place outside of her establishment— and then aggravating a 
breach of the peace; third, deputized or not, the petty or parish constable was the 
“leading law-enforcement officer at parish level”, and “by the close of the sixteenth 
41. Bennett, Judith M. Ale, Beer, and Brewsters...: 36.
42. Harman was the town constable. Three witnesses, John James, Fabian Crookehorn, and Joan Smith 
reference Harman as the rightful constable of Kingsland. LMA. DL/C 213, p. 659, l. 41 (John James’ 
testimony), 661, 11. 30-40 (Fabian Crookehorn’s testimony), and p. 662, l. 56, and p. 662, ll. 30-31 
(Joan Smith’s testimony). 
43. Bennett, Judith M. “Misogyny, Popular Culture, and Women’s Work”. History Workshop, 31 (1991): 
166-188, especially, 177. 
44. Karlin, Katherine L. Alewives and Factory Girls: Representations Of Working Women (A Critical Study) And 
Freedom Of Information (A Novel). Los Angeles: University of Southern California (PhD Dissertation), 2009: 
15. 5 March 2012 <http://digitallibrary.usc.edu/assetserver/controller/item/etd-Karlin-2996.pdf>. 
45. Jhappan, Radha. “The Equality Pit or the Rehabilitation of Justice?”, Women’s Legal Strategies in 
Canada. Toronto: University of Toronto Press Incorporated, 2002: 175-234, especially, 179. Jhappan is 
paraphrasing Carol Smart’s argument in Smart’s 1996 essay “Feminism and Law: Some Problems of 
Analysis and Strategy”.
Imago TemporIs. medIum aevum, viii (2014) 297-326. issn 1888-3931
Mary C. Bodden310
century hardly any aspect of law enforcement at the local level lay outside his 
brief” including administering the vagrancy acts, supervising all alehouses within 
his area of jurisdiction, and placing an offender (even an offender of a breach of 
peace about to take place) “in the stocks or in some other secure place until justice 
could be done”46; fourth, this same woman not only publicly challenged a man’s 
(Crowther’s) authority, but also publicly renewed that challenged by bringing him 
to court on a defamation suit. Nevertheless, the legal outcomes of the original case 
are remarkable: a judge reversed his decision, a judge publically chastised the male 
authority who is attempting to restore order, two local citizens sought out the 
judge to offer testimony in favor of an alewife against a landowner (Crowther is a 
landowner; Fabrian Crookhorn has a lease from him), and, finally, Moorfoote herself 
brought the case to court a year later, reviving the public memory of Crowther’s 
disgrace and retrieving her public reputation. Moorfoote and Smith, as well as 
Agnes Barons, “resorted to law” in negotiating the relationship between power and 
community and law that governed their lives. Their interpretative maneuvers and 
rhetorical courage changed legal realities and legal priorities, at least for that day. 
Interpretative maneuvers prove to be even more critical in Suzan More’s (of 
London) testimony in the case of John Scales contra Thomas Creede (June 18, 
1608) not only because the subject matter, rape, exemplifies the limits of language 
itself, that is, the “limits within which the sexual body [could be] presented in 
legal records”47, but also because her narrative illustrates the politics of recognition 
and its deeper layer of misrecognition of the fundamental conditions of her 
existence. More’s testimony exposing Thomas Creede, Shakespeare’s printer, as 
an unscrupulous individual smugly confident of raping servant girls without his 
having to suffer either financial or legal consequences is especially relevant here: it 
raises the issue of what happens to female solidarity when women must respond to 
another woman’s illegitimate pregnancy. 
Suzan More, 25 was in the service of a bookseller Randall Birke and his wife (Anne 
Birke), not as a maidservant48, but rather as a “point-maker” (lace-points), a skill 
that made her valuable to Mrs. Birke who was “using the trade of point making”49. 
Thomas Creede’s business as a printer brought him naturally (and frequently) to 
Birke’s house. There, as More testifies, he chatted her up, asking her persistently, “if 
she would go drink with him some time”50 but More refused. Creede then applied 
to her “maistress mrs Birke, for ‘leave for her’ to go, even asking ‘mrs Birke to 
goe with them herselfe[,] which she often denyed’”51. After some time, both Mrs. 
46. Briggs, John; Harrison, Christopher; McInnes, Angus; Vincent, David. Crime and Punishment...: 53-54.
47. Gowing, Laura. Common Bodies: Women, Touch and Power in Seventeenth-Century England. New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 2003: 86.
48. More receives no wages other than those for pointmaking. In her response to the 15th Interrogatory 
of Creede, she deposes that she “had no wages but wrought her points by the gross and was payd by the 
gross, viz [namely] 5s. 4d a gross” (LMA. DL/ C 218, 144). 
49. LMA. DL/ C 218, 138.
50. LMA. DL/ C 218, 138.
51. LMA. DL/ C 218, 138.
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Birke and More agreed to go with Creede for a drink of wine, and More testified 
that Creede came “sondrye times after that to get More ‘to goe with him to drinke 
wine’”52. However, in midsummer, when she went with Creede to the Sun Tavern 
in Aldersgate Street, he gave her so much wine that More “was drunk and sick 
withall”53, and then “Creede had her this deponent [More] to one widdow Grimes 
house by Pickt-Hatch54 an alehowse and had her upp into a chamber wheare she 
this deponent as she saythe lay downe on a bed to sleepe and she saythe that at that 
time he the same Thomas Creede had the carnall knowledge of her this deponents 
body”55, a situation which we would now construe as date rape. From that point 
on, when More refused to go with him to the taverns, “he would be very angry and 
then he would sett others sometimes taverne boyes and sometimes the boyes of 
the forenamed widdow Grimes”56 to stand in front of the Birke’s house, barring her 
progress and beckoning her to go to the tavern. More testified that twice after that, 
Creede had “carnall knowledge of her... body” at “widdow Grimes howse”57. (It is 
from Widow Grimes’ collusion and Thomas Creede’s predatory behavior that More 
very likely saved Blanche Howell, the kitchen maid: “Blanche Howell...coming 
one daye home to Randall Birkes howse with som extraordinarie behavior and her 
face red”58, Suzan More “perceyved she had byn drinking wine [,] thoroughe her 
this deponents [More’s] importunitie”, Blanche Howell “confessed unto her this 
deponent that she had byn with Mr. Creede and he had willed her to bring home 
her mrs child which she then had and then meet him at goodwief Grimes howse 
but she this deponent [More] would not suffer her to goe at that time”59. Even Anne 
Birke was not off limits to Creed’s sexual advances. More testified that after she, 
Mrs. Birke and Creede had been for the first time at the taverne, Creede bragged 
that if he had given Mrs. Birke “but a pynt more he sayed he could have don what 
he had would with her”60. Anne Birke herself testified that among his many sexual 
overtures, Creede had told her that she “had a sweet pair of lips, and if she were a 
good wench she would let him have some part with her husband”61). 
52. LMA. DL/ C 218, 139.
53. LMA. DL/ C 218, 139.
54. Pickt-Hatch (see: The Dramatic Works of William Shakespere [sic], from the Text of Johnson, Stevens, and Reed, 
ed. Nicholas Rowe, London: George Routledge & Co., 1856: 16, footnote unnumbered. Falstaff refers to 
Pickt-Hatch in Act II, sc. ii of the Merry Wives of Windsor. According to the footnote, Pickt-Hatch was in 
Clerkenwell. Ben Jonson references Pickt-Hatch in Epigrams, book I, XII: On Lieutenant Shift: “Shift, here 
in town, not meanest amongst Squires. That haunt Pickt-Hatch, Mersh-Lambeth, and Whitefryers. In 
Thomas Middleton’s Black Book, featuring Lucifer as a tourist in London, Lucifer calls Pickt-Hatch: “the 
very skirts of all brothel-houses” (117).
55. LMA. DL/ C 218, 139. 
56. LMA. DL/ C 218, 139.
57. LMA. DL/ C 218, 139.
58. LMA. DL/ C 218, 142-43.
59. LMA. DL/ C 218, 143.
60. LMA. DL/ C 218, 142.
61. LMA. DL/ C 218, 163 (Anne Birke’s testimony).
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When More became pregnant, Creede turned churlish: “if you had gone from 
your maister and left his house and would have byn at my discrestion” as I asked 
you, “I would have provided for you”, but seeing that you didn’t, “Goe seek you 
another ffather to your child of your will for I meane not to ffather it”62. In any case, 
he added, “I will shift it of well enoughe and my weif will helpe to cleare me of this 
matter and to shift it of us as she hathe shifted me of suche matters as this is before 
now”63. When More told Mr. & Mrs. Birke of her condition, they “being much 
grieved sent for him the same Thomas Creede to a tavern”64, to which Creede came 
with his wife. There Creede’s wife proved her husband’s warning to be true, facing 
down More with such fierce threats that More was too “terrifie[d]” to know “what 
to do”65. Later, Mrs. Creede, who seems to have eventually believed More’s story, 
gave her ten shillings to have the Cambridge Carriers cart More to the country to 
deliver her baby. But this happened in the “great frost time”66, and More could not 
“endure the uneasie going of the waggen”67, and returned to London where, unable 
to get a place to stay, she “laye about in the streets”, until a poor woman in Gravell 
Lane in Houndsditch took her in where “she laye too dayes and too nightes without 
meat or drink”68. Eventually through the efforts of Anne Birke, More found a place 
to lay in at Rebecca and Edward Handley’s house where her delivery was attended 
by a midwife, Philippa Webb and Isabel Chaundler (a neighbor of the Handleys). 
When more finally delivered her baby, neither Mrs. Creede, nor Mrs. Birke were 
there in time. 
In Suzan More’s testimony interpretative strategies were perilously critical: 
the limits of language itself were (and still are) what every woman testifying to 
rape, —or sexuality itself— faced. It is not a matter of linguistic impoverishment; 
it is, rather, that the discourse of law has long been already colonized by the ethos 
of power asymmetry, male subjectivity, and the social and political practices of 
dominant interests. The effect was to rigorously set the “limits within which the 
sexual body [could be] presented in legal records”69. 
1. Rape narratives and the limits of language
Garthine Walker argues that rape narratives “were by definition legal narratives”, 
and their representation was formed by certain “legal constraints, demands, 
62. LMA. DL/ C 218, 139-140.
63. LMA. DL/ C 218, 140.
64. LMA. DL/ C 218, 140.
65. LMA. DL/ C 218, 140.
66. LMA. DL/ C 218, 141.
67. LMA. DL/ C 218, 141.
68. LMA. DL/ C 218, 141.
69. Gowing, Laura. Common Bodies...: 86.
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conventions, and the inherent values of rape law”, and its “extra-legal associations”70. 
It isn’t just the “intentions of the storytellers” that are embedded in the narratives, 
Walker cautions. In the “act of telling her story a woman defined a reality about rape 
and its meaning, which was at the same time conditioned by available languages”71 
—a condition, Walker observes, not unlike the juridical discourse of modern rape 
law famously critiqued by Catharine MacKinnon, namely, that “under law, rape is 
a sex crime that is not regarded as a crime when it looks like sex”72. And in the 
early seventeenth century jurists’ views, rape was beginning to look like sex. Indeed, 
long before the jurist Matthew Hale’s (1609-1676) influential work73 defining rape 
unequivocally as a sexual crime, the shift from viewing rape as a property crime to 
construing it as a sexual crime was well underway. Hale insisted that carnaliter cognovit 
(“carnally knew”) was essential to the definition of rape, as well as rapuit (“ravished”, 
or “[forcefully] carried away”)74. That “there must be an actual penetration or res in 
re” simply strengthened the sexual nature of the act and distanced it yet further from 
its former view as an offense against property. This shift in the legal perception of 
rape had enormous consequences: the focus, no longer being the person’s property, 
became, rather, the victim’s resistance and moral character, including (her) state of 
mind (i.e., her consent). As Gowing succinctly puts it: “the more rape was undersood 
as sexual, the harder it was to believe women”75. 
The impact of this focus upon their sexuality or reputation, led women to 
change the ways that they talked about rape. Gowing states, “Women’s testimonies 
typically underplayed or erased the actual act of sexual penetration that defined 
rape legally”76. Their testimonies “strove to write sex out of it”.77 Walker sums up 
its effect: “By definition, speech about rape was semantically restricted”78. And the 
legal system’s structure naturally reinforced that semantic restriction. The legal 
structure —“Judges, magistrates, constables, commissioners and trial jurors were 
all male, in Tim Stretton’s words; “it was men who made laws, men who staffed 
70. Walker, Garthine. “Rereading Rape and Sexual Violence in Early Modern England”. Gender & History, 
10/1 (1998): 1-25,especially, 3. 
71. Walker, Garthine. “Rereading Rape...”: 5. 
72. MacKinnon, Catharine A. Toward a Feminist Theory of the State. Cambridge (Mass.): Harvard University 
Press, 1989: 172. Walker paraphrases this particular quote about rape by Catharine MacKinnon. 
73. Hale, Matthew. Historia Placitorum Coronae. The History of the Pleas of the Crown. London: Sollom 
Emilyn, 1800: I, 626-636 (ebook). 10 July 2012 <books.google.com/books?isbn=1584772824>. Historia 
Placitorum Coronae, The History of the Pleas of the Crown was directed around 1680 and published c. 1736.
74. Hale, Matthew. Historia Placitorum...: 627. Matthew Hale (631) references the “opinion of Mr. Finch 
cited by Dalton...and by Stamford out of Britton [14th-century text considered the earliest summary of the 
law of England in the French tongue], that it can be no rape, if the woman conceive with child, seems 
to be no law, mulier enim vi oppressa concipere potest”. The electronic version of the book says page 631, but 
the actual page number printed at the upper right hand of the scanned text is p. 731.
75. Gowing, Laura. Common Bodies...: 92.
76. Gowing, Laura. Common Bodies...: 92. 
77. Gowing, Laura. Common Bodies...: 93.
78. Walker, Garthine. “Rereading Rape...”: 5. 
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the courts, men who took down the testimony of witnesses and recorded judicial 
decisions and orders”79. 
2. The linguistic consequence
There was a momentous linguistic consequence to this. On the one hand, these 
constraints, demands, and possibilities of the legal system constituted social practices 
and a political ordering of social relations (political, insofar as it is based, as is every 
political impulse, on some form of exclusion). On the other hand, they operated as 
a linguistic device that reorganized More’s and every assaulted woman’s ways of 
representing their role in the rape and representing, too, the (assumed) degree of 
their consent and desire. If sex were now written out, what sort of narrative was 
available to victims of rape and assault? Laura Gowing’s research in court records 
offers an intriguing and illuminating answer: in “court, women’s stories of their 
sexual experiences emphasised one thing above all others: passivity. Defending 
themselves, women described ‘condescending’ to men, being ‘persuaded to give 
in to the satisfying of his lust’, being ‘tempted unto uncleanness’, ‘yielding up her 
body’”80. They declared themselves to be “weak, repentant, ‘defiled’”81. Some of this 
passivity, Walker writes, was linked to the fact that “talking about rape formally 
before male officials might have produced a differently nuanced account from, say, 
that which a young woman told her own mother”82. Moreover, for women, “[r]
esponsibility for sex, and the blame and dishonour that went with it, was feminised 
in ways that made sexual language an inappropriate medium through which to 
report a rape”83. Even “the language which signified sexual intercourse was itself one 
of female complicity”84. Melissa Sanchez adds another feature that played into the 
“legally passive femininity”85 posture: “Rape survivors risked appearing disorderly 
and unfeminine if they represented themselves as aggressively fighting their 
assailants”86. The effect on their testimonies is significant: “Consequently, in their 
testimony many women depict themselves as passive objects of brutal male lust, 
denying themselves agency in an attempt to remove any trace of accountability”87. 
(Unquestionably, women —as decades of scholarship have established— commanded 
79. Stretton, Tim. Women Waging Law in Elizabethan England. Cambridge (UK): Cambridge University 
Press, 1998: 220. 
80. Gowing, Laura. Common Bodies...: 86.
81. Gowing, Laura. Common Bodies...: 86.
82. Walker, Garthine. “Rereading Rape...”: 4.
83. Walker, Garthine. “Rereading Rape...”: 5.
84. Walker, Garthine. “Rereading Rape...”: 6.
85. Gowing, Laura. Common Bodies...: 86.
86. Sanchez, Melissa E. Erotic Subjects: The Sexuality of Politics in Early Modern English Literature. Oxford 
(UK): Oxford University Press, 2011: 88.
87. Sanchez, Melissa E. Erotic Subjects...: 88.
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both domestic and public authority and power in a variety of discursive fields88; the 
passivity referenced in the latter half of this essay refers solely to rhetorical strategies 
women appear to have adopted in response to the legal discourse available for their 
representation of rape and sexual assault). The volume of testimonial evidence in so 
many of the church courts across England confirms Walker’s point: “The ease with 
which confessions reproduced these formulas itself says something about available 
languages and meanings”89. 
3. The politics of recognition
Significantly, the ease with which confessions reproduced these formulas also 
says something about the way that identity and subject position became constructed 
for women in the discourse of the law. Gowing’s examination of the court records 
indicates that the legal representation of rape and assault as a sexual crime —itself 
a linguistic practice— led women in court to adopt a countering linguistic practice. 
Internalizing the ideology that encoded their sexual reputation as part of the 
definition of rape, they now struggled to recode their subject position in the rape or 
assault act. They presented themselves as sexually passive. It is classic Althusserian 
structure of misrecognition. (It also echoes the initial argument of Seyla Benhabib’s 
situated and contextualized subjectivity —to be touched upon later). Althusser’s 
thesis is that we acquire our subject position or identity through historically rooted 
cultural narratives that tell us the “way things should be”. In Althusser’s analogy, we 
are “hailed” by these narratives, these ideological constructs, much “along the lines 
of the most commonplace everyday police (or other) hailing: ‘Hey, you there!’”90. 
A person so interpellated or hailed recognizes “that the hail was ‘really’ addressed 
to him, and ‘that it was really him who was hailed (and not someone else)’”91. But 
in Althusser’s view this “recognition” of being hailed is actually “misrecognition”92 
88. Fletcher, Anthony. Gender, Sex and Subordination in England 1500-1800. New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1995; Livingston, Sally. Marriage, Property, and Women’s Narratives. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2012; Wall, Wendy. Staging Domesticity: Household Work and English Identity in Early Modern Drama. 
Cambridge (UK): Cambridge University Press, 2002; Walker, Garthine. Crime, Gender and Social Order in 
Early Modern England. Cambridge (UK): Cambridge University Press, 2003; Brown, Pamela A. Better a 
Shrew than a Sheep: Women, Drama and the Culture of Jest in Early Modern England. Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press, 2002. 
89. Gowing, Laura. Common Bodies...: 86.
90. Althusser, Louis. “Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses (Notes Towards an Investigation)”, 
Lenin and Philosophy, and Other Essays, Louis Althusser, ed. New York: Monthly Review Press, 1972: 174.
91. Althusser, Louis. “Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses...”: 174.
92. “Jacques Lacan has described how the moment when a child recognizes its own image in the mirror 
is crucial for the constitution of the ego”. “The mirror phase occurs at a time when the child’s physical 
ambitions outstrip his motor capacity, with the result that his recognition of himself is joyous in that 
he imagines his mirror image to be more complete, more perfect than he experiences his own body. 
Recognition is thus overlaid with misrecognition: the image recognised is conceived as the reflected body 
of the self, but its misrecognition as superior projects this body outside itself as an ideal ego” and “gives 
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because in the very act of turning to respond to the hailing, indeed, in the act of 
perceiving that one is being called, the person has already acknowledged her/his 
subject position in relation to that “hailing”. “Misrecognition” does not, here, mean 
misrecognizing because the assigned identity is not one’s “true” one (although no 
single identity is ever one’s true one)93. It means, rather, that the “recognition” is 
actually retroactive: you become conscious of being a subject only “after” being 
born into pre-established social relationships; you are responding to the “already 
there”. So, too, we acknowledge or “misrecognize” the various cultural narratives 
into which we are born. Moreover, we are hailed ceaselessly; we go through the 
rituals of ideological (mis)recognition from person to person and discourse to 
discourse. Pierre Bourdieu provides a particularly lucid, practical example: our 
ordinary qualifications, our competencies and skill (in other words, our “cultural 
capital”), can also be a source of misrecognition and symbolic violence. “Therefore 
working class children can come to see the educational success of their upper- 
and middle-class peers as a legitimate” because what is actually often class-based 
inequality is seen by these children, instead, as the result of hard work or even 
natural ability94. One can see why Patchen Markell, drawing on Hannah Arendt’s 
notion of the non-sovereign character of human action, concluded that the practice 
of recognition always involves a “‘misrecognition’ of a different and deeper kind: 
not the misrecognition of an identity, either one’s own or someone else’s, but the 
misrecognition of one’s own fundamental situation or circumstances”95. 
The problem is that our subject positions are often reinforced by “the 
misrecognition of others”, Charles Taylor wrote, “and so a person or group of people 
can suffer real damage, real distortion, if the people or society around them mirror 
back to them a confining or demeaning or contemptible picture of themselves”96. 
Centuries of ideology had long proposed that the women are excessively sexualized 
beings. And women being “hailed” thus, (mis)recognize themselves within that 
ideological construct. (Mis)recognition obscures every subject’s “real conditions of 
existence” and, in women’s case, it naturalizes their acceptance of their inferiority 
in the pre-established social roles. In the late sixteenth and early seventeenth 
rise to the future generation of identification with others. This mirror-moment predates language for the 
child”. As Laura Mulvey goes on to say, “it is the birth of the long love affair/despair between image and 
self image” (61). Mulvey, Laura. “Visual Pleasure and Narrative Cinema”: 57-68 (originally published in 
Screen, 16/3 [1975]: 6-18), 8 March 2012. <https://wiki.brown.edu/confluence/display/MarkTribe/Visu
al+Pleasure+and+Narrative+Cinema>. 
93. The term “misrecognize” does, however, begin to include the concept of “not recognizing” one in 
later theorists, e.g., Axel Honneth (the issue of social death), Charles Taylor, Amy Gutmann (especially in 
the context of multiculturalism), Nancy Fraser (recognition as an aid to the redistribution of power and 
wealth), Anthony Appiah, Ernst Bloch (misrecogntion as disrespect), etc.
94. Van den Berg, Hendrik. “A Reflexive Sociological Case for Heterodox Economics”: 11. International 
Confederation of Associations for Pluralism in Economics (ICAPE). 20 October 2012 <http://www.icape.org/
g5-van%20den%20berg.pdf>. 
95. Markell, Patchen. Bound by Recognition. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003: 5.
96. Taylor, Charles. “The Politics of Recognition”. Multiculturalism, Amy Gutmann, ed. Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1994: 25-73, especially, 25. 
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century, the evolving definition of rape makes it clear that sexuality —closely allied 
with women and not so much with men— was inherent to the definition of rape. 
Women’s nature was defined by their sexuality, rape’s nature was defined largely 
by the sexuality of the act. There is a pernicious reciprocity of (mis)recognition in 
these imperfect terms of exchange: women’s sexual identity as socially constructed 
overlaid by rape’s sexual identity as socially encoded into law. 
4. Suzane More: misrecognition and legal passivity
The first three pages of Suzan More’s five and one-half page deposition classically 
illustrates the misrecognition of the “legally passive femininity” posture referenced 
by Gowing, Walker, Chaytor, Sanchez, and others. Based on the cultural conviction97 
that “women barely owned their own bodies”98, and the assumption that those 
bodies were “persuadable beyond the limits of rational consent,” women tended 
to frame the greater part of their sexual narratives as an account of “how men 
persuaded them into sex”99. More’s three pages detail the unrelenting badgering 
pursuit of her by Thomas Creede. She describes Creede’s first “carnall knowledge” 
of her body as occurring only after a number of inappropriate100 but innocent 
meetings for wine with him over a period of weeks, and only after he had given 
her so much wine that she became drunk and ill, was taken to an upstairs chamber 
of an alehouse where, in her drugged state, she was raped (as current legal views 
would characterize it, given that there could have been no legally willing consent). 
Further, More portrays her few other assignations with Creede as being “enticed” 
by Creede, and she stresses the harassment that met her subsequent determinations 
not to meet him. Creede’s literal deployment of physical forces is quite shocking in 
its publicly questionable intentions: not only did he send boys from the tavern to 
intercept and hound More, but he was joined in this also by widow Grimes’ sending 
a reinforcement of boys from her own alehouse’s staff. 
97. Such as “The Merry Conceits and Passages of Simon and Cisley, Two Lancashire Lovers”, along with 
“Susan and William Her Apprentice,” and the “Merry Dialogue between Andrew and His Sweetheart 
Joan”, in: Spufford, Margaret. Small Books and Pleasant Histories: Popular Fiction and its Readership in 
Seventeenth-Century England. London: Methuen & Co., 1981, Chapter VII and Chapter III, respectively. 
Most of these are taken from Samuel Pepys’s “Penny Merriments”, Volume I and II, listed in Chapter 
VI of Spufford’s Small books and Pleasant Histories. See also her discussion of the wooing letters and love 
letters found in early seventeenth-century chapbooks. 
98. Gowing, Laura. Common Bodies...: 86.
99. Gowing, Laura. Common Bodies...: 87.
100. Anne Birke, looking for Suzan, found her at the tavern with Creede, and reproached them both 
about the inappropriate nature of a married man spending money on a maidservant at a tavern. LMA. 
DL/C 218, 156-157.
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5. More: dissent and the socially accountable ordered self
But More’s testimony is significant because it did not finally settle for a passive 
discursive stance. And in that respect, it becomes exemplary of Bert Van der Brink’s 
strongly worded observation: “Recognition would not be one of the most debated 
terms in social and political theory if claims as to the misrecognition of individuals 
did not play a distinctive role in processes of...emancipation”101. How did More or 
how does anyone contest the cultural narratives into which they are born? How 
challenge the misrecognition of aspects of one’s own identity? Althusser provided 
the possibility of our responding to a variety of discourses: because a variety of 
discourses necessarily conflict with and thereby comment on other discourses, they 
invite examination of the status quo. Benhabib argues that we “become aware 
of who we are by learning to become conversation partners in these narratives. 
Although we do not choose the webs in whose nets we are initially caught, or 
select those with whom we wish to converse, our agency consists in our capacity 
to weave out of those narratives our individual life stories, which make sense for 
us as unique selves”102. That is indeed a certainty, particularly for the authentic self, 
but an acute provocation or stimulus seems fundamentally necessary to challenge 
the misrecognition in the first place. Axel Honneth’s concept of conflicts as part of 
the politics of recognition brings us a bit closer to Suzan More’s situation, namely, 
marginalized and excluded groups. In his book The Struggle for Recognition, Honneth 
maintains that conflicts make clear that persons are “vulnerable to moral injury”103. 
Marginalized or excluded groups, he argues, develop “a consciousness of injustice” 
that evaluates how social circumstances rob them of chances to voice injuries”. 
Conflicts between individuals and groups, in his view, are, at bottom, moral identity-
claims104. 
However, the most useful and productive means of inducing misrecognition is 
perhaps the more powerfully charged concept of “disaster”. Disasters constitute 
“fruitful sites...because they disorient us and expose what otherwise tends to remain 
obscured in the course of everyday life”105. Those moments of disorientation, Schiff 
101. Statement of Rationale: “Recognition and Power: A Symposium”, Utrecht University, March 2003. 
25 June 2012 <http://www.phil.uu.nl/recognition/>. 
102. Benhabib, Seyla. The Claims of Culture: Equality and Diversity in the Global Era. New Jersey: Princeton 
University Press, 2002: 15. 
103. Honneth, Axel. The Struggle for Recognition: The Moral Grammar of Social Conflicts. Cambridge (UK): 
Polity Press, 1995: 48. Michael Spång argues that Honneth views “the moral disapproval of social events 
and circumstances, misrecognition, as a motive for resistance and struggles for recognition, in terms of 
a set of relations of recognition” (Spång, Michael. “Recognition, Misrecognition, and Capitalism”. The 
Global Site. 2001. 28 June 2012 <http://www.theglobalsite.ac.uk/press/112spang.htm>). Subjects are 
informed of the absence of this recognition, Honneth writes, “by experiencing disrespect in such a way 
that they see themselves obliged to engage in a ‘struggle for recognition’” (Honneth, Axel. The Struggle 
for Recognition...: 69).
104. “Justice is a matter of conflict”. Deranty, Jean-Phillipe; Renault, Emmanuel. “Politicizing Honneth’s 
Ethics of Recognition”. Thesis Eleven, 88 (2007): 92-111, especially, 96-97 (quotation is on p. 97).
105. Schiff, Jacob. “The Persistence of Misrecognition”. Paper: Political Theory Workshop. 12 January 
2009. University of Chicago: 22. 24 September 2012 <http://ptw.uchicago.edu/Schiff09.pdf >.
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says, can be moments of possibility because in dislocating routine, they disrupt our 
experience of the normal, and can re-align our attention or re-situate us vis-à-vis 
that experience. In looking back at that experience, we necessarily look back at 
the ideological construct of which it is part. We look back, in other words, at the 
validity of the culturally constructed views of one’s moral and social self. It is in 
such moments —which Bourdieu calls “crises”— “that the possibility of overcoming 
misrecognition emerges”106. 
The disaster for More was, of course, her seduction by Creede, her pregnancy 
as a single woman, the loss of her job107, the loss of her reputation (Mrs. Worrralls 
named her as “Creede’s whore” in the Birke’s household), and the public humiliation 
by Creede and his wife. Every one of these components plays into the cultural 
narratives concerning the single servant woman: he pre-established role of women’s 
inferiority, “contemporary ideas about women’s sexual drive and moral frailty”108, 
the single woman’s threat to family relationships, women in taverns, etc. For More 
this “moment of disorientation” seems to have become a moment of possibility. In 
looking back on the experience, she has, it seems, conducted a narrative herself 
whereby the socially acquired ideological constructs and their narratives —women’s 
sexual drive, their moral frailty, etc.— are all challenged.
More’s was a discursive strategy that used at least three registers: the first was a 
narrative of self and community; that is, she represented herself as a single woman 
whose good work mentality and whose code of behavior was seemingly supported 
by people of status in the community, —in other word, hers was a coherent, socially 
accountable ordered self. With the second discursive strategy, she represented 
Creede’s persistent violation of the accepted model of male conduct: not only 
was his not a socially accountable ordered self but also his willful abuse of his 
business alliances and their staffs (including the Birkes and Widow Grimes) as well 
as the abuse of his spousal partnership testified to a contemptuous and felonious 
relationship with the community. Third, she represented her own collaboration with 
Creede’s reprehensible behavior. Not surprisingly she was at times complicit with 
the dominant narratives. Representing her relationship necessarily revealed issues 
of human rights and socio-political wrongs. In this she challenged the imaginary, 
comprehensive quality of the dominant grand narratives by using “little narratives 
to undermine grand narratives”109.
Representation is the key. “[R]epresentation... ushers dissent into being”110, Rita 
Copeland laconically puts it. If one is required to defend one’s social or moral self, 
106. Schiff, Jacob. “The Persistence of Misrecognition”...: 4.
107. LMA. DL/C 218, 138: More testifies to now working for Hugh Jackson in Fleetstreet, London, and 
earlier in the house of Edward Handby for 10 weeks or thereabouts in months following her pregnancy. 
108. Capp, Bernard. When Gossips Meet: Women, Family, and Neighborhood in Early Modern England. Oxford 
(UK): Oxford University Press, 2003: 227.
109. Allen, Julia M.; Lester Faigley. “Discursive Strategies for Social Change: An Alternative Rhetoric of 
Argument”. Rhetoric Review, 14/1 (1995): 142-172, especially, 170, n. 11.
110. Copeland, Rita. Pedagogy, Intellectuals, and Dissent in the Later Middle Ages: Lollardy and Ideas of Learning. 
Cambridge (UK): Cambridge University Press, 2004: 148.
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such representation necessarily produces dissent because the discursive process of 
dissent confronts and examines the legitimacy of views that claim to constitute 
one’s social and moral self. Law, of course, is one of the chief ways of producing 
such dissent because law, by nature of dealing with conflict, compels oppositional 
recognition. And in doing so, it likewise compels us to examine the narratives that 
organize those ideological constructs. 
This is the critical moment that Copeland speaks of, when “dissent” becomes “the 
hermeneutical moment that finds no adequate articulation or representation, that 
key moment in ideological formation that Althusser (drawing on Lacan) describes 
in terms of the ‘structure of misrecognition’ between the law and the subject that it 
commands, where the meanings produced by either side confound and exceed all 
signifying intentions”111.
6. More: representation of the self and the community
More’s representation of herself and her character occur already in the deposition’s 
opening formula providing the background of the witnesses. We can assume a 
fundamentally good character in More: under oath, she has testified to a history of 
living and working in four places over a period of five years and three months with 
no incidents112. (It was not uncommon for single women servants to migrate from 
job to job113). Even more important, this case against Creede came to the Consistory 
Court not through More’s efforts or through the churchwardens who ordinarily 
would present it as a disciplinary complaint. Indeed, More had no intention of 
bringing any court action. She represented herself as having refused in mid-winter, 
in want and near starvation to seek legal help offered through a kinsman who 
having heard of her extreme straits had come to her as she lay in a poor woman’s 
111. Copeland, Rita. “Introduction: Dissenting Critical Practices”, Criticism and Dissent in the Middle Ages, 
Rita Copeland, ed. Cambridge (UK): Cambridge University Press, 1995: 14.
112. LMA. DL/ C 218, 138: Suzanna More, servant of Hugh Jackson in the parish of St. Briggitt in Fleet 
Street, London, and where she stayed for 6 or 7 weeks and before that she lived in the house of Edward 
Handby for 10 week or thereabout, and before that with a certain Randall Birk in the parish of St. Giles 
outside Cripplegate for about a year, and before that in Holy Trinity Minories with a certain Mistress 
Longe for three months or thereabout, and before that with a certain Arthur Goodgame in the parish of 
St. Lawrence Pountny for one year, and before that with a certain Mistress Lambert in the parish of St. 
Margaret New Fish Street for a year or thereabouts, and before that with Mistress Lynsey, widow, in the 
parish of St. Peter Cornhill for nearly two years, and before that in the city of Cambridge she was born 
and live, and she said that she is 25 years of age, and she has known John Scales for seven years or longer 
and Thomas Creede since Easter 1607 and before that.
113. Hubbard, Eleanor. City Women: Money, Sex, and the Social Order in Early Modern London. Oxford 
(UK): Oxford University Press, 2012: 35. Hubbard writes, “maidservants were highly mobile: when 
they switched services, they usually switched parishes as well, sometimes moving across London. For 
example, Joan Clay from Essex left her service in Aldersgate Street to serve an apothecary in nearby 
Cheapside. Then she moved to St. Mary Bermondsey across the Thames, where she stayed for two or 
three years, before moving north again to St. Sepulchre”. 
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house without meat or drink114 and offered to ensure some aid for her if she would 
“procure him the same Creede to be called before som justice”. Rather, the case 
was prosecuted by a certain John Scales under the cause of ecclesiastical order 
(which included questions of paternity). More was prevailed upon to be a witness: 
she testified that “she cameth to depose the truth in this cause at the request and 
perswasion of John Scales”115, whom she had known for seven years or longer, and 
who she thought, but wasn’t certain, was “somewhat of kyn unto” her116. Scales 
was able to procure a warrant bringing Creede before Sir Stephen Soame (c. 1544-
1619) mayor of London (1598) and member of the House of Commons (1601), who 
undertook to hear Creede’s versions (accompanied by his wife) before he examined 
More. More testified that when she came into Sir Stephen Soame’s presence for 
her examination, she heard Sir Stephen say, “Indeed” —apparently in response to 
Creed and his wife having just “towld their tale” to him. More added, significantly, 
“but after Sir Stephen had privately examined her this respondent [More]”, “Sir 
Stephen was then of another mynd and opinion, and bound Creede over to the 
sessions” —the very session, presumably, in which Suzan More was now testifying 
in the John Scales contra Thomas Creede case. Quoting Sir Stephen’s single emotional 
“indeed”, Suzan More’s narrative conveyed the immediacy of her fear of being 
disadvantaged by her social superiors, the Creedes, and by the historically rooted 
cultural narratives in their favor. If Schiff’s theory is correct (i.e., disruption and 
dislocation cause us to look back at the ideological construct of which it is part), 
More’s adding that single further remark regarding Sir Stephen’s change of mind, 
re-situated her vis-à-vis her experience. It attests, in my view, to the power of More’s 
having organized all the individual fragments of her past year to create a coherent 
profile of details that captured the contingency of her situation in sharp contrast to 
Creede’s obsessive and ruthlessly schematic pursuit that viewed her sexual integrity 
and her livelihood as disposable.
Moreover, More never asked for money or support from Creede, but only to have 
a place or a house in which to deliver her baby, and she testified that after returning 
from the harrowing wagon trip, she lay five nights in an old house “neere unto 
Birkes howse117 before ever Birke or his wife knew of her this respondents being 
there”118. Given that this was England’s worst winter in fifty years when ice split 
trunks of trees, birds and animals died, and the freezing of the Thames hindered 
the importing food to London from neighboring counties, inducing critical food 
114. LMA. DL/ C 218, 141, following More’s description of lying in a poor woman’s house in Gravell 
Lane in Houndsditch “too dayes and too nightes without meat or drink”, she says that her kinsman, 
More, “ther came unto her”. 
115. LMA. DL/ C 218, 143, article 8, Interrogatory.
116. LMA. DL/ C 218, 143, article 2, Interrogatory. Regarding John Scales, More adds: “but in what 
degree she knoweth not only she saythe she hathe heard her ffather saye that he the same Scales was of 
kin unto her grandmother”.
117. LMA. DL/ C 218, 146. Eleanore Hubbard, City Women, reads “Birke’s House” as Brickhouse, but it 
appears to be “Birkes” (84).
118. LMA. DL/ C 218, 146.
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shortages and raising food prices, it says a great deal about More’s character that she 
didn’t ask for shelter from the nearby Birkes who had proven to be friends to her. 
Admittedly, she may well have been wary: it was more than possible that she would 
have been carted out of town immediately, again, as was the practice of so many 
villages and towns toward unwed mothers about to give birth. But it also references 
her character, suggesting that she was not the scheming woman as the master 
narratives implied. Finally, the combination of these gentlemen, Birke, Scales, and 
Sir Stephen Soame, supporting Suzan More points to More’s considerable support 
within the power structures, and in turn, attests to her at least quondam good 
citizenship. 
7. Creede’s violation of the accepted models of male conduct
Creede’s behavior toward business associates and the community was exposed 
as not only sexually scandalous but also as criminal. More referenced the constant 
coercion —not simply in Creede’s setting the squads of boys to stalk More as she 
left her house, but also in coercing her, first, to bring a defamation suit against Mrs. 
Worrall, and then to suborn herself: he 
earnesley perswaded her [...] to clere him of his incontinentie with her [...] and to save his 
credit[,] he sometimes speaking her fayre sometimes threatening her that he would have her 
to Bridewell [...] [so that] she [...] did saye before all the company that then was ther being 2 
or 3 of Mrs. Worralls neighbors that Mr. Creede never lyed incontinently with her119.
Bridewell was no empty threat (even Mrs. Creede used it later to try to terrify 
More into naming someone else as the father of her unborn child): Bridewells (or 
houses of correction) were part of a “punitive trend, and increased the possibility 
that women would be disproportionately punished for bearing children out of 
wedlock”120. The 1610 revision of the 1576 bridewell statute required justices of 
the peace “to incarcerate in bridewells all unmarried mothers whose children 
were chargeable to the parish”121. Steve Hindle points out in fact that at the turn 
of the century, punishment of unwed mothers in Essex, for example, “gradually 
intensified... from a few hours in the stocks, to lashes ‘moderately given’ at the 
cart’s tail, to public whippings until their backs was [sic] bloody”122. Creede’s threat 
of putting a maidservant in Bridewell unless she brought (false) charges against 
a married woman, Mrs. Worrall, approaches terrorizing: fornication was a legally 
119. LMA. DL/C 218, 145.
120. Peters, Christine. Women in Early Modern Britain, 1450-1640. Houndmills-Basingstoke: Palgrave 
MacMillan, 2004: 85.
121. Peters, Christine. Women in Early Modern Britain...: 85.
122. Hindle, Steve. The State and Social Change in Early Modern England, c. 1550-1640. New York: St. Martin’s 
Press, 2000: 161. 
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punishable act. Bridwell Court Minute Books record that between 1565 and 1606 
even women’s simple cross-dressing, suggestive, it was thought, of a loose life, sent 
women to the work-house in Bridewell. Indeed, according to Jean Howard, most 
of the (cross-dressed) women incarcerated in Bridewell “appear to be unmarried 
women of the serving class eking out a precarious living in London”123. Moreover, 
Worrall’s married status greatly disadvantaged More. A married woman’s cultural 
capital gave her greater value to society in terms of power and status than a single 
maidservant could claim. Only dire intimidation could compel More to bring the 
suit, she later confessed to Anne Birke. Under oath, therefore, she asserted that she 
had never lain with Creede. She admitted, as well, that her oath compelled Mrs. 
Worrall both to ask public forgiveness of them and to pay the court charges. 
The willingness of Creede to misuse the court system was of a piece with his 
aggressive mistreatment of women. One of the most startling testimonies about the 
breadth of Creede’s illicit sexual activities occurs in Anne Birke’s deposition: as she 
and Mrs. Creede accompanied Suzan More to meet the Cambridge carrier departing 
from the Bull in Bishopsgate, More disclosed to them further details about Creede’s 
affairs at the widow Grimes’ house: “he used to have other women besides her 
there, as namely one from Lambeth, another that had a great belly, and a third that 
was there in the same widow Grimes’ house but she being grown now something 
old she said that he had told her that he cared not for her now”124. Mrs. Creede, 
learning this for the first time, wept later with Anne Birke and Randall Birke that 
her husband: 
was bare of money and much behindhand or at least nothing aforehand, and oftentimes 
wanted money for his necessary use, and she was constrained to make shift for it. “Ay, 
sometimes” quoth she, “to pawn my own clothes to my back, and”, quoth she, “thus this 
way doth he waste his money”, she meaning by his unchaste life. And further said thus: “It 
is not yet”, quoth she, “above eight weeks agone since I was fain to shift off a like matter for 
him as this is”125.
It was scarcely surprising that John Scales and eight witnesses from the community 
would finally bring Creede forward for prosecution for bastardy. 
123. Howard, Jean E. “Cross-Dressing, the Theater, and Gender Struggle in Early Modern England”. 
Crossing the Stage: Controversies on Cross-Dressing, Lesley Ferris, ed. London: Routledge, 1993: 20-46, 
especially, 22. Johanna Rickman notes that the bill of 1628 suggests the penalty for fornication and 
adultery to be whipping, and Ian Archer asserts that “[i]ncontinent persons were carted, sent to Bridewell, 
and presented to the church courts” (Rickman, Johanna. Love, Lust, and License in Early Modern England: 
Illicit Sex and the Nobility. Burlington: Ashgate, 2008: 24; Archer, Ian W. The Pursuit of Stability: Social 
Relations in Elizabethan London. Cambridge (UK): Cambridge University Press, 1991: 235; see also 251).
124. LMA. DL/C 218, 159; Anne Birke.
125. LMA. DL/C 218, 160-161; Anne Birke.
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8. Representation of more’s collaboration with creede
Scrutinizing her experience with Creede, under oath, compelled More to confront 
her morality. Although she testified to meeting Creede for drinks several times 
more, and to having sex with Creede at Widow Grimes place twice more, the geater 
and more dramatic part of her narrative focuses upon her resistance. Resistance and 
dissent are everywhere: resisting Creede’s multiple, draining attempts to get her to 
drink with him; resisting Creede’s pressure that she quit the Birkes and be “at [his] 
discrestion”; resisting Creede’s stratagems to lay the blame for her pregnancy upon 
Randall Birke; and finally, resisting the pressure to bring suit against Creede. 
Her resistance and dissent frame Creede’s conduct as legally actionable. When 
she stressed her self-control in the face of Creede’s relentless pressure to coerce her 
into drinking with him, she stressed, at the same time, the uncivilized and irrational 
nature of Creede: “he would be very angry and then he would sett others”, using 
a staff of tavern boys and Widow Grimes’ alehouse boys, to position themselves in 
front of the Birkes’ house so as to harass her with signals to come to the tavern. 
When Creede turned on her after she acquainted him with her pregnancy, More 
represented him as not denying having fathered the child; rather, she quoted his 
objection to her not having left both her employment and the Birkes’ house to be, 
as he said, 
“at my discrestion” whereby “I would have provided for you, and you should have wanted 
nothing but seeing you have continued still ther at Mr. Birkes goe seek you an other ffather 
to you child of your will for I meane not to father it, I will shift of it well enoughe and my 
wife will helpe to cleare me of this matter and to shift it of us as she hathe shifted me of such 
matters as this is before now”126.
Given Creede’s cool self-assurance and implied past of bastardy, the justice 
of peace would have understandably wondered at Creede’s word “discretion,” 
—which had always meant “pleasure”, as well as “judgment”. He would have 
certainly found irregular Creede’s insistence that More leave her employment and 
her place of residence to be at Creede’s discretion. Did Creede have in mind the 
same future (prostitution) for Suzan More that he seemed to have devised for his 
other maidservants liaisons still ongoing at Widow Grimes alehouse? 
More’s resisting of Creede’s stratagems to lay the blame for her pregnancy upon 
Randall Birke took an interesting turn in the presence of Justice Soame. When 
More told Justice Soame that Creede would say to her “in a perswading manner... to 
say that her master loved her for he would saye thus unto her...: ‘Do not thy master 
love thee [?] His wife is a fowle sow and if I had so prettie a wench in my howse 
as thou art I must needs love her”’127, Soame immediately stipulated that More’s 
delivery be attended by a neutral party: “‘it were good there should be a strange 
126. LMA. DL/ C 218, 139-140; Suzan More.
127. LMA. DL/ C 218, 147, 148-149; Suzan More.
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midwife’, he said expressly, ‘thus not provided by you, Mistress Creede, nor yet by 
Birke”’. Soame recognized the legal consequences of Creede’s speech: it was a ploy 
to impugne Randall Birke as the putative father. 
9. Overcoming misrecognition
Those three registers —More’s narrative of self and community, her representation 
of Creede’s character as ignoble and irrational, and her account of her complicity—
were the social and legal consequences of More’s thorough inquiries of her legal 
culpability. They are the little narratives that undermine the “grand narrative” of 
dominant interests. The crisis that could produce the possibility of overcoming 
misrecognition had occurred, as Bourdieu theorized. On the one hand, Suzan 
More comprehended her own blameworthiness. On the other, she exposed the 
speciousness of the cultural narratives that view her (and all women) as the sexually 
driven and morally frail humans, with men being, presumably, morally superior. 
She was indeed morally culpable, but Creede’s conduct not only included criminal 
acts, but also involved the community in his sexual predation. 
10. Conclusion
Three women other than More appear in this deposition: Anne Birke, Margery 
Creede, Blanche Howell. Yet, none of them gave her shelter despite More’s pregnancy’s 
nearing its delivery and despite the freezing temperatures of an historically brutal 
winter. One woman, a “poor woman”, although she allowed More two days and 
nights in her house, apparently offered not a morsel of bread or a drink of water. At 
first glance there seemed to be not only no alliances, but also almost no compassion 
either. Linda Pollock’s observation that “alliances were highly context dependent” is 
undeniable128. In this case, the context is that of single women who were pregnant. 
In London, for example, “harbouring” a single pregnant mother was a crime, and the 
church courts prosecuted it regularly. Agnes Goddard, for example, “was prosecuted 
at the church courts in 1610 for harbouring and delivering a single woman ‘without 
enquiring her name and who was father thereof’”129. Some networks appear to 
have been available to help a single woman giving birth, but these networks were 
known largely only through a series of references and private communications, and 
128. Pollock, Linda A. “Childbearing and Female Bonding in Early Modern England”. Social History, 22/3 
(1997): 286-306, especially, 287.
129. Gowing, Laura. “Giving Birth at the Magistrate’s Gate: Single Mothers in the Early Modern City”, 
Women, Identities and Communities in Early Modern Europe, Stephanie Tarbin, Susan Broomhall, eds. 
Aldershot-Hampshire: Ashgate, 2008: 137-150, especially, 141. 
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operated on “an ability to forget, or not ask, names of those involved”130. On the 
other hand, Anne Birke ultimately proved to be a single mother’s greatest champion. 
When she found out that Suzan had returned to London from Canterbury, she tried 
to persuade the Creedes to take responsibility, but they refused. She then mustered 
two citizens to track Suzan down and charged them with examining her closely131. 
On learning that Suzan maintained her story about Creede, she was instrumental 
in convincing Suzan to have Creede called before a Justice. Birke also arranged for 
More to lay in for her birthing with Rebecca and Edward Handly in Westminster. 
Creede was to pay the charges for this, and later, was compelled to assume charge 
of More’s baby which he and his wife put out to nurse in the country132. That Suzan 
More, at the time of this deposition —some seventeen weeks after the birth of 
her child— was working for a Hugh Jackson, Stationer in Fleet Street, might also 
have been at least partly the consequence of Anne Birke’s efforts: More would have 
needed references, and Hugh Jackson, like Randall Birke, was a stationer. Whatever 
the connections, it is clear that Suzan More, as Eleanor Hubbard put it, “did not 
sink irretrievably into prostitution”133. Rather, she resisted the cultural narratives 
of women’s economic and sexual position into which she had been born: she did 
indeed —as was true of many single pregnant women— “have trouble making even 
the most basic arrangements for lying in”, yet, she was not driven from parish to 
parish by self-deputized neighbors and local officials134; she shouldered the burden 
of her responsibility, asking no money from Creede and no help from her employers, 
the Birkes; she was clearly regarded by members of the community —the Birkes, 
John Scales, and her kinsman— as a viable economic and social member of the 
community, and in the end, the judgment for her indicates that her narrative of self 
and community, her representation of Creede’s character as ignoble and irrational, 
and her account of her complicity, ultimately outmaneuvered the interpretations of 
(male) legal priorities and depictions of legal realities. 
130. Gowing, Laura. “Giving Birth at the Magistrate’s Gate...”: 142.
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132. LMA. DL/ C 218, 186; Randall Birke. 
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